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INTRODUCTION  
Between 1953 and 1960, the United States’ overall military and 
intelligence-gathering capacities grew enormously, driven by President 
Eisenhower’s “New Look” approach to fighting the Cold War. But the 
distribution of powers within this New Look national-security state, the 
shape of its institutional structures, and its sources of legitimacy remained up 
for grabs. The eventual settlement of these issues would depend on 
administrative constitutionalism—the process by which the administrative 
state both shapes and is shaped by constitutional norms, often through 
ostensibly non-constitutional law and policymaking.1 
Constitutional concerns about civil liberties, administrative procedure, 
and the separation of powers ran highest in those branches of the national-
security state responsible for regulating civilian and military manpower, such 
as the Loyalty-Security Program, an inter-agency effort to root out 
ideologically deviant federal employees, and the Selective Service System, 
the civilian agency created in 1940 to register, classify, and select millions of 
young men for compulsory military service. This Article focuses on the 
Selective Service System, which has received far less attention from legal 
scholars despite the fact that it exercised authority over a far larger (and 
arguably more vulnerable) population than did the Loyalty-Security 
Program.2 Administrative constitutionalism inflected every stage of the New 
Look draft’s development: from the size and composition of draft calls; to the 
arguments that draft administrators made when lobbying their congressional 
patrons; to the competing interpretations of the Selective Service System’s 
organic statute and regulations offered by Justice Department and Selective 
Service lawyers; to judicial review of these interpretations; to how executive 
 
1 See Gillian Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1900 (2013) (“In 
practice, administrative constitutionalism . . . encompasses the elaboration of new constitutional 
understandings by administrative actors, as well as the construction (or “constitution”) of the 
administrative state through structural and substantive measures.”). 
2 Important recent works on the Loyalty-Security Program include SUSAN L. BRINSON, THE 
RED SCARE, POLITICS, AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 1941–1960 (2004); 
ROBERT M. LICHTMAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND MCCARTHY-ERA REPRESSION: ONE 
HUNDRED DECISIONS (2012); LANDON R. Y. STORRS, THE SECOND RED SCARE AND THE 
UNMAKING OF THE NEW DEAL LEFT (2012); and Karen M. Tani, Flemming v. Nestor: 
Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and the Making of “New Property”, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 379 (2008). 
For the legal history of the Selective Service System in this period, see JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG 
& ERIC MERRIAM, IN A TIME OF TOTAL WAR: THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE NATIONAL 
DEFENSE, 1940–1954 (2016); JEREMY K. KESSLER, FORTRESS OF LIBERTY: THE RISE AND FALL 
OF THE DRAFT AND REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming); and Megan Threlkeld, “The 
War Power is Not a Blank Check”: The Supreme Court and Conscientious Objection, 1917-1973, 31 J. POL’Y 
HIST. 303 (2019). 
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branch lawyers responded to—and sometimes tried to preempt—judicial 
criticism by modifying the substance and procedure of draft decisionmaking. 
By reconstructing the anxious, constitutional dialogue that shaped the 
administration of military manpower under President Eisenhower’s New 
Look, this Article explores the role that administrative constitutionalism 
played in the development of the American national-security state, a state 
that became both more powerful and more legalistic during the pivotal years 
of the Cold War.3 The Article also questions the frequent identification of 
administrative constitutionalism with the relative autonomy and opacity of 
the federal bureaucracy. The back-and-forth of administrative 
constitutionalism continually recalibrated the degree of autonomy and 
opacity that characterized the draft apparatus. This evidence suggests that 
bureaucratic autonomy and opacity may be more usefully understood as 
products, rather than preconditions, of administrative constitutionalism. 
The remainder of the Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces 
readers to President Eisenhower’s New Look grand strategy, and its 
relationship to the President’s legal, political, and economic commitments on 
the homefront. Part II looks more closely at the legal and political culture of 
administrative law reform that blossomed during President Eisenhower’s first 
term, and assesses the threat this culture posed to the Selective Service 
System. While countervailing Cold War imperatives helped the System avoid 
new legislative restrictions on its classification and induction authority, the 
judiciary proved more aggressive. 
Part III reconstructs the steady rise of judicial scrutiny of Selective 
Service decisionmaking over the course of the 1950s. During this period, the 
federal courts came to identify the administration of civilian and military 
manpower as a unique threat to civil liberty. Whereas administrative law 
reformers mounted a wholesale critique of agency governance, the civil 
libertarian critique of Cold War manpower administration enabled lawyers 
and judges to target the autonomy and authority of the Selective Service 
System with more precision. This civil libertarian critique did not only 
confront draft administrators in the courts. To the contrary, the critique’s 
steady judicial success depended in part on the unwillingness of Justice 
Department lawyers to counter it. At the heart of Part III, and the Article as 
a whole, lurks this intra-administrative conflict between Selective Service and 
Justice Department officials as to the practical importance and constitutional 
integrity of draft administration. 
 
3 For this periodization of the Cold War, see generally Anders Stephanson, Cold War Degree 
Zero, in UNCERTAIN EMPIRE: AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE IDEA OF THE COLD WAR 19-49 
(Joel Isaac & Duncan Bell eds., 2012). 
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Part IV traces the Selective Service System’s response to these mid-1950s 
defeats. Having lost the support of both legal professionals and military 
planners, draft administrators cultivated a new client base by transforming 
their regulatory agenda. Earlier in the decade, the System had resisted capture 
by the deferment lobby, the coalition of industrialists, educators, and middle-
class families who wanted as much high-quality manpower as possible deferred 
into the private sector. While the deferment lobby’s demands were at odds 
with the egalitarian vision of veteran draft administrators, the New Look’s 
libertarian legal culture and austere grand strategy had effectively foreclosed 
that vision. By becoming an agency specializing in deferment, rather than 
induction, the Selective Service System traded the contentious confines of the 
courtroom for the sprawling office park and the university quad. This trade 
gave draft administrators a badly needed infusion of social legitimation and 
political support. But it also tied the fate of the Selective Service System to 
the New Look paradigm: should political and military leaders abandon the 
New Look, and seek to wage another limited war with a conscript army, draft 
administrators would have to contend not only with the skepticism of the 
courts and the Justice Department, but also with the anger of a deferment 
lobby that had come to rely on the Selective Service System’s largesse. 
I. A NEW LOOK FOR THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM  
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1952 presidential victory put a Republican in the 
Oval Office for the first time in twenty years. Although the Party had chosen 
Eisenhower for his reputation as a politically moderate war hero, the former 
Supreme Allied Commander and early Cold War grand strategist ran on a 
passionately anti-communist, anti-bureaucratic, and civil-libertarian agenda. 
Given this rhetoric, Republican hopes were high that a full rollback of New 
Deal and Fair Deal governance might finally be at hand. 
According to the 1952 Republican platform, the Roosevelt and Truman 
administrations had “violated our liberties by turning loose upon the country 
a swarm of arrogant bureaucrats and their agents who meddle intolerably in 
the lives and occupations of our citizens.”4 For too long, Democratic 
administrators had “arrogantly deprived our citizens of precious liberties by 
seizing powers never granted” and “worked unceasingly to achieve their goal 
of national socialism.”5 During the campaign, Eisenhower declared “his 
intention to rid Government of the incompetent, dishonest, [and] disloyal.”6 
Although electoral politics encouraged this kind of rhetoric, Eisenhower was 
 
4 Text of the Republican Party’s 1952 Campaign Platform Adopted by National Convention, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 11, 1952, at 8. 
5 Id. 
6 JOANNA GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE 197 (2012). 
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“skeptical of government-by-administration” and openly “question[ed] the 
constitutionality of the administrative state.”7 As he warned his close friend, 
the textile magnate George Sloan, the “drift toward statism” that had 
characterized the Truman years “must be halted in its tracks.”8 The 
“individual liberties” of the American people and their “entire system of free 
government” depended on an administrative counterrevolution.9 
Putting his words into action, the new President pursued three policies 
to shrink the federal bureaucracy and to render it more hospitable to the 
free market. First, “Eisenhower sought to replace what he called an 
‘exclusive dependence on Federal bureaucracy’ with ‘a partnership of state 
and local communities, private citizens, and the Federal Government, all 
working together.’”10 
Second, Eisenhower sought to reform the inner workings of the federal 
government by changing the sorts of bureaucrats who ran it. This meant 
opening the doors of the White House to big business, while closing them to 
alleged subversives. The President “tightened loyalty standards for federal 
hiring and retention” and fired suspect employees throughout the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Justice Department.11 He then used his appointment 
power to place businessmen and other admirers of corporate governance 
throughout his cabinet and at the top of federal agencies and commissions.12 
Finally, and most significantly, Eisenhower reined in New Deal and Fair 
Deal governance by slashing agency budgets. Given the “substantial and 
immediate budgetary gap for the coming fiscal year,” Eisenhower needed 
little political cover to do so.13 Defense spending had spiked during the 
Korean War—from thirteen billion dollars in 1950 to forty billion in 1952—
and the annual national-security budget was scheduled to break the sixty 
billion mark in 1955.14 Veterans’ benefits, debt service, and the costs of 
running the rest of the administrative state would add another twenty-billion 
dollars to the annual bill.15 Although President Truman had pushed through 
tax increases to cover some of these costs, a reluctant Congress had attached 
short sunset provisions to the most aggressive—and progressive—revenue-
boosting measures.16 The excess-profits tax, targeting those industries that 
reaped the greatest benefits from Cold War spending, was set to expire in 
 
7 Id. at 199. 
8 Robert Griffith, Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 87, 92 (1982). 
9 GRISINGER, supra note 6, at 199 (quoting Eisenhower). 
10 Griffith, supra note 8, at 106. 
11 GRISINGER, supra note 6, at 197. 
12 Griffith, supra note 8, at 105-107. 
13 AARON L. FRIEDBERG, IN THE SHADOW OF THE GARRISON STATE 126 (2002). 
14 Id. at 125. 
15 Id. at 126. 
16 Id. 
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June 1953.17 By the spring of 1954, both individual and corporate income-tax 
rates would “revert to their pre-emergency levels.”18 An eighteen-billion-
dollar shortfall loomed.19 
Eisenhower saw this “ticking fiscal time bomb” as a great opportunity.20 
Not only did it provide an ideologically muted argument for scaling back the 
regulatory ambitions of agencies such as the National Labor Relations Board 
and the Federal Security Administration, but fiscal retrenchment also 
harmonized with Eisenhower’s ambitious plans to transform American 
military strategy. Having witnessed the spread of total war as Supreme Allied 
Commander during World War II, Eisenhower doubted the viability of 
limited yet manpower-intensive ground wars, such as the one that he 
inherited in Korea. He believed that any local conflict with Soviet-backed 
forces would eventually spiral into a total confrontation decided by nuclear 
superiority. Rather than training, outfitting, and risking men to serve as 
prelude to this decisive, devastating contest, Eisenhower preferred to focus 
military spending on what his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called 
“massive retaliatory power.”21 An unparalleled nuclear arsenal would make it 
“possible to get and to share more basic security at less cost.”22 In October 
1953, the National Security Council codified Eisenhower and Dulles’s “New 
Look” approach.23 
The national security agency most directly threatened by New Look’s 
strategic focus on nuclear weapons, covert operations, and cheap security was 
the Selective Service System. Since the System’s creation in 1940, Selective 
Service administrators had registered, classified, and drafted millions of 
young American men for compulsory military service.24 This work made the 
draft apparatus a crucial but highly controversial bridge between the welfare 
and warfare states built by Eisenhower’s Democratic predecessors, exposing 
draft administrators to a host of critics, from pacifists and civil libertarians to 
corporate lawyers, business lobbyists, and conservative politicians opposed to 
 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 126-27. 
20 Id. at 126. 
21 See CAMPBELL CRAIG, DESTROYING THE VILLAGE: EISENHOWER AND THERMONUCLEAR 
WAR 48 (1998) (quoting Dulles). For further discussion of Eisenhower’s strategic vision, see generally 
CAMPBELL CRAIG & FREDRIK LOGEVALL, AMERICA’S COLD WAR 139-215 (2013). 
22  See GERARD DEGROOT, THE BOMB: A LIFE 189 (2004) (quoting Eisenhower). 
23 See generally Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy, A Report to the National 
Security Council, NSC 162/2 (Oct. 30, 1953). 
24 See generally GEORGE FLYNN, THE DRAFT (1993). 
 
2019] New Look Constitutionalism 1755 
federal supervision of labor relations, education, and the health and safety of 
vulnerable populations.25 
The New Look “put the draft in limbo.”26 Draft calls dropped from 
472,000 men in 1953 to 253,000 in 1954 to 153,000 in 1955, and continued to 
fall thereafter.27 For draft administrators, this collapse in strategic support for 
conscription could not have come at a worse time, as the Selective Service 
System was still reeling from the many defeats it had suffered in the federal 
courts during and after the Korean War. By 1954, Selective Service 
administrators had come to believe that only a series of bold amendments to 
their organic statute might push back against the judiciary’s debilitating 
supervision of the registration and classification process.28 Yet if the 
Commander-in-Chief no longer saw conscription as an essential weapon in 
the anti-communist arsenal, would he really stick his neck out to scold federal 
judges for being too protective of the civil liberties of draft registrants? 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM AND THE SELECTIVE                  
SERVICE SYSTEM  
Making matters worse, many legislators felt that President Eisenhower 
was not doing nearly enough to tame the administrative state, despite his 
budget cuts, pro-business appointments, and heightened loyalty standards. 
Influential figures in the legal and business world agreed. In particular, the 
American Bar Association and its corporate clients warned that neither the 
Administrative Procedure Act nor its implementation by the federal courts 
had provided a sufficient corrective to the executive branch’s domination of 
American social and economic life.29 In July 1953, congressional and private 
sector critics converged on a provisional solution: the resurrection of the 
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, 
colloquially known as the Second Hoover Commission. 
The First Hoover Commission—named for its chairman, former 
Republican President Herbert Hoover—operated from 1947 to 1949. As one 
of the Commission’s Democratic members recalled, Hoover’s goal was to use 
procedural reform of the executive branch “as a vehicle to overturn the New 
 
25 See generally J. GARRY CLIFFORD & SAMUEL R. SPENCER, JR., THE FIRST PEACETIME 
DRAFT (1986); see also FLYNN, supra note 24, at 88-133 (reviewing the major sources of Truman-era 
criticism). 
26 FLYNN, supra note 24, at 138; FRIEDBERG, supra note 13, at 179-80. 
27 FLYNN, supra note 24, at 139. 
28 See Letter from Col. Omer to Gen. Renfrow, 1-2 (Jan. 31, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Central 
Files 1948–1963, Box 35 (submitting a series of “desirable amendments” for consideration). 
29 See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 128 HARV. L. REV. 718, 762-
772 (reviewing DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE (2014)). 
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Deal in substance.”30 Hoover himself denounced the “welfare state” as “a 
disguise for the totalitarian state.”31 The re-election of President Truman in 
1948, however, stymied his plans.32 Four years later, with a Republican in the 
White House, Hoover and his allies felt that the time was ripe to finish the 
work they had begun in 1947. At the Second Commission’s inaugural meeting, 
Hoover declared, “This time we will not be deflected from our purpose.”33 
The most radical arm of the Commission was its Task Force on Legal 
Services and Procedure. Most of the Task Force’s members knew each other 
from the American Bar Association, where they had spent decades discussing 
how to impose more court-like procedures and greater judicial review on New 
Deal and Fair Deal administrators.34 The Task Force’s final report attested to 
this legal and political vision: “The more closely that administrative 
procedures can be made to conform to judicial procedures, the greater the 
probability that justice will be attained in the administrative process.”35 Such 
statements, however, risked falling afoul of one of the Second Hoover 
Commission’s purported goals—the improvement of administrative efficiency. 
The anti-bureaucratic ideology of the mid-1950s was shot through with 
this contradiction: on the one hand, critics targeted the administrative state’s 
sloth and wastefulness; on the other hand, they assailed its lawless, summary 
decisionmaking.36 The Task Force insisted that these two countervailing 
critiques were, in fact, compatible: “Formalization of administrative 
procedures along judicial lines is consistent with efficiency and simplification 
of the administrative process.”37 If implemented in full, however, the Task 
Force’s “recommendations would have significantly enlarged administrative 
staffs . . . slowed down administrative decision making, and vastly increased 
the work of the federal courts.”38 At nearly every point, the value of efficiency 
was trumped by the charge that “individual rights were being lost in the 
administrative process.”39 
While this emphasis on “formalization” and individual rights conflicted 
with the Commission’s charge to balance fairness and efficiency, it 
harmonized with popular doubts about the legitimacy of administrative 
 
30 GRISINGER, supra note 6, at 158 (quoting Rowe). 
31 Id. at 186. 
32 Id. at 161-78. 
33 Id. at 208. 
34 Id. at 213. 
35 COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOV., TASK FORCE REPORT ON 
LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 138 (1955) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
36 See Reuel Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing 
Definition of Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1414-16 (2000). 
37 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 138. 
38 GRISINGER, supra note 6, at 215. 
39 Id. 
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government. As Louis Jaffe, a prominent critic of many of the Task Force’s 
proposals, acknowledged: “It is now generally conceded that judicial control 
is a necessary condition of administrative law in this country. The public,” 
Jaffe continued, “demands that there be an independent organ of government 
to guarantee that the agencies stay within the limits set by statute. This 
guarantee is important not only to the individual citizen but to the agency if 
it is to win public acceptance.”40 The Task Force’s main recommendations 
took the form of a proposed piece of legislation, the Administrative Code, 
that began circulating in January 1955. 
When Selective Service headquarters received a copy on February 1, the 
Code sparked a panic. Passage of the Code would doom the legislative 
reforms that draft administrators believed were necessary to repair the 
damage that a decade of judicial interference had done to the post-WWII 
Selective Service System. Indeed, the Code affirmatively endorsed even 
greater judicial control of the draft. 
The current draft law—the Universal Military Training and Service of 
1951— contained language exempting the Selective Service System from most 
procedural rules and judicial supervision imposed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act. The APA itself had established this precedent, exempting the 
1940 draft law from all its requirements except for the publication of 
administrative regulations. The newly proposed Administrative Code, by 
contrast, abolished all such exemptions.41 According to the Task Force, the 
purpose of these exemptions had been “to cover emergency functions which 
were of a temporary nature . . . following World War II.”42 It no longer made 
sense, however, to think of “emergency” functions such as conscription as 
“temporary.” Exposing the existential dilemma of a peacetime, Cold War 
draft, the Task Force concluded that “[c]ontinued exemption of [these] 
functions . . . is now clearly anomalous.”43 
On February 23, General Hershey wrote the Second Hoover 
Commission’s executive director to detail the threat that the Code posed to 
conscription. If “the proposed Code [were] enacted into law,” Hershey 
insisted, “it would be essential” to amend the current draft law “to provide 
that [its] functions . . . shall be excluded . . . .”44 Otherwise, the entire 
registration, classification, and induction process “would be subject to all 
requirements of the Code,” including “formal hearings on all issues, 
representation by attorneys, and preliminary and final review by the courts 
 
40 Louis Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1291 (1955). 
41 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 389-90. 
42 Id. at 141. 
43 Id. 
44 Letter from Lewis B. Hershey to John B. Hollister, 1 (Feb. 23, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Box 36. 
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of all agency actions.”45 Such judicial and quasi-judicial impositions would 
have a devastating impact on the work of “[s]ome 3950 local boards . . . the 
members of which serve without compensation, and for the most part are 
laymen not skilled in legal procedures.”46 These boards were responsible for 
upwards of two million “classification actions” every year.47 The Code would 
also impede the “[a]dditional thousands of classification actions . . . 
completed annually by the 94 appeal boards and by the National Selective 
Service Appeal Board which acts for the President.”48 In short, Hershey 
concluded the Code “could not be complied with in the Selective Service 
operation if any men were ever to be promptly available for delivery to the 
armed forces for induction.”49 
Thankfully for the Selective Service System, the Task Force’s 
“revolutionary” project stalled in Congress.50 While the full Commission 
agreed with much of the Task Force’s proposed Code, there was internal 
disagreement about the most aggressive, anti-bureaucratic measures, such as 
making judicial review available at every stage of administrative 
decisionmaking.51 Some commissioners objected to such provisions as overly 
“legalistic,” while others approved of them in theory but worried that they 
would mark the Commission as a body of lawyers unconcerned with the cost 
and efficiency of government.52 So a majority of commissioners declined to 
embrace the Code in its entirety.53 Instead, the Commission forwarded the 
Code to Congress for its independent consideration while formally endorsing 
a smaller set of reforms.54 
While more modest than the Code’s call for total judicialization of the 
administrative state, the Commission’s proposals still would, in the words of 
President Eisenhower’s Budget Bureau, “turn[] the clock back with a 
vengeance!”55 Such an ambitious renovation of the national bureaucracy was 
too big a gamble during a period of great geopolitical uncertainty. Anti-
communist ideology drove the critique of the administrative state, but it also 
limited the risks political leaders were willing to take when it came to 
degrading state capacity in the midst of a standoff with the Soviet Union. 
 
45 Id. at 1. 
46 Id. at 2. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See GRISINGER, supra note 6, at 227 (“Consistent opposition from the agencies and a lack of 
strong pressure in Congress left the bills adrift.”). 
51 Id. at 218. 
52 Id. at 220. 
53 Id. at 219. 
54 Id. at 220. 
55 Id. at 224. 
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Hobbled by internal doubts and disagreements, the Commission saw its own 
recommendations, as well as the Task Force’s Administrative Code, shelved 
by Eisenhower and allied legislators. 
The spirit of administrative law reform did not, however, require political 
consensus to thrive. In the seven-year interim between the death of Franklin 
Roosevelt and the election of Dwight Eisenhower, the federal judiciary had 
expanded its supervision of the administrative state, implementing in a 
piecemeal manner many of the doctrinal reforms that the Hoover 
Commission sought to codify. 
Take one of the Commission’s more controversial recommendations: the 
replacement of the APA’s substantial-evidence standard for reviewing 
administrative fact-finding with a more exacting, clearly erroneous 
standard.56 The defeat of this recommendation at the political level only 
masked the fact that federal judges had already been moving toward a higher 
standard for some time. As administrative law scholar Bernard Schwartz 
noted at the time: “Whether or not the [Commission’s] recommendation is 
adopted, that will not alter the fact that the scope of review in federal 
administrative law has very definitely been tending to approach that which 
prevails” when appellate courts review the fact-finding of district courts—
that is, “clearly erroneous” review.57 In other words, at least some courts were 
already acting like the Commission’s recommendations were the law of the 
land. These courts tended to treat administrative agencies more like inferior 
judicial bodies than autonomous executive decisionmakers, precisely the 
approach that Hoover preferred. 
Nor were courts necessarily bashful about this changed relationship with 
administrative agencies. As early as 1952, Schwartz noted, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals had declared that “it is difficult to draw the line between 
the function of an appellate court in passing upon the decision of a trial judge 
sitting without a jury . . . on the one hand, and the function of the court in 
reviewing the decision of an administrative tribunal on the other . . . . The 
mental processes of the reviewing authority which are called into action in 
each situation are so similar that they can hardly be distinguished.”58 
Most striking of all was the fact that even when courts reviewed 
administrative decisions exempt from the APA—including those of the 
Selective Service System—they were increasingly likely to imitate the Fourth 
Circuit’s approach, if not its rhetoric. “[I]t is generally agreed today by 
students of administrative law that the operation of the APA should be 
 
56 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 416. 
57 Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Justice and Its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1390, 1393 (1955). 
58 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1952)). 
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uniform throughout the federal administrative process,” Schwartz 
explained.59 “Few outside the immediate agencies concerned do not deplore 
the exception of individual agencies from the procedure law.”60 
On March 14, 1955, the Supreme Court decided four draft-law cases that 
confirmed Schwartz’s analysis. The draft had dodged a bullet when the Second 
Hoover Commission’s vision of administrative reform proved too risky for the 
President and many in Congress to support. But the March 14 Supreme Court 
decisions hit the Selective Service System squarely in the chest. Assessing the 
damage, draft administrators became more certain than ever before that only 
a strong political response to the courts would save conscription. 
III. THE CIVIL LIBERTARIAN CRITIQUE OF MILITARY                    
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION 
In the wake of the Selective Service System’s widely praised performance 
during World War II, most American voters and political leaders agreed that 
an unprecedented regime of “peacetime” conscription was an imperative of 
the global struggle against communism. Patriotic acceptance of the Cold War 
draft did not, however, insulate the Selective Service System from the 
growing suspicion of “New Deal bureaucracy” among legal elites. As this 
anti-bureaucratic mood spread through the federal courts in the mid-1940s 
and early 1950s, formerly deferential judges began to embrace the task of 
assessing the validity of Selective Service decisionmaking. Not only had 
Congress offered no resistance to this development, it had even flirted with 
legislation exposing the draft to more judicial control. Meanwhile, the Justice 
Department became increasingly reluctant to bring draft prosecutions and 
increasingly skeptical of the Selective Service System’s own practices. 
Between 1950 and 1953, the United States’ shooting war against 
communism on the Korean Peninsula only accelerated these trends. In 1952, 
the Supreme Court rebuffed the Truman administration’s efforts to extend 
the practices of emergency governance pioneered during the New Deal and 
World War II to the more limited context of mobilization for a “limited” 
military campaign in a single operational theater.61 Then, in 1953, the high 
Court responded to a rush of prosecutions of Korean War draft resisters by 
imposing a higher degree of scrutiny on Selective Service fact-finding.62 No 
longer would federal judges be expected to defer to administrative decisions 
on a draft registrant’s entitlement to statutory exemptions from military service. 
 
59 Id. at 1391. 
60 Id. 
61 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For the political and military 
context of the decision, see generally MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE (1977). 
62 Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953). 
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Given these unfavorable trends, the Supreme Court’s decision to hear 
argument in four major draft-law cases in the Fall of 1954 alarmed Selective 
Service leaders. All but certain of an unfavorable outcome, they spent the 
holidays preparing a disciplined administrative response to whatever new, 
damaging doctrines the Court might announce. In mid-January, General 
Counsel Daniel Omer began to schedule conferences with state Selective 
Service directors for “immediately after the Supreme Court renders its 
decisions.”63 At that time, draft administrators would “discuss the effect” of 
the decisions, and “promote a uniform enforcement policy . . . with respect 
to the [legal] issues” that the Supreme Court resolved.64 Omer believed a 
uniform enforcement policy to be critical for at least two reasons: first, 
because uniform enforcement was a hallmark of the rule-of-law values that 
many draft critics felt the Selective Service System violated; second, because 
uniform enforcement would make it easier for the General Counsel’s Office 
to manage its case load, controlling when and under what circumstances 
lower-court judges would get a chance to elaborate—and potentially extend—
the Supreme Court’s rulings. 
On March 14, the Supreme Court confirmed the fears of Omer and his 
colleagues. Three of the four draft-law decisions handed down that day 
reversed the convictions of draft registrants who had been denied 
conscientious-objector status.65 Each reversal placed new limits on draft 
administrators’ freedom of action, while legitimating novel legal objections 
to the draft. The fourth decision, Witmer v. United States, at first seemed to 
cut the other way, affirming the conviction of a Witness who had been denied 
conscientious-objector status.66 But upon closer inspection, the Witmer 
majority opinion delivered more bad news: it signaled a new standard—even 
more exacting than the one that Dickinson v. United States had established two 
years earlier—for determining when classification decisions had an adequate 
“basis in fact.”67 
A. Witmer v. United States: Heightened Scrutiny of Selective Service Fact-finding 
The author of the majority opinion in Dickinson, former Attorney General 
Tom Clark, was also responsible for all four March 14 decisions, including 
 
63 Letter from Col. Daniel O. Omer to Warren Olney III, Assist. Att’y Gen. (Jan. 23, 1955), 
NARA, RG 147, Central Files 1948-1963, Box 96. 
64 Id. 
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Witmer. In Dickinson, Justice Clark had expanded the federal courts’ authority 
to review the fact-finding of Selective Service administrators: whenever a 
draft resister made a prima facie case that he was entitled to a certain 
classification, judges should ask whether there was “affirmative evidence” in 
the administrative record supporting an alternative classification.68 If the 
answer was “no,” the resister could not be convicted for refusing to serve.69 
At the time, legal commentators had noted that Dickinson’s “affirmative 
evidence” rule worked much like the “substantial evidence” standard that 
courts used when reviewing the factual basis of administrative decisions 
covered by the Administrative Procedure Act.70 The draft apparatus, however, 
was not supposed to be subject to such a searching standard of review. 
Although Justice Clark’s majority opinion insisted that the Court was not 
altering this deferential status quo but simply elaborating the basis-in-fact 
standard it had invented seven years earlier in Estep,71 the claim was 
unconvincing. Draft administrators, Justice Department lawyers, and legal 
scholars all viewed the Dickinson Court’s expansion of judicial review as 
potentially disastrous for future enforcement of the draft law. 
Still, there had remained hope that the affirmative evidence rule could be 
cabined to the particular circumstances of the Dickinson case, which involved 
a registrant who claimed to be a minister, and thus entitled to a statutory 
exemption. Might denials of conscientious-objector—rather than 
ministerial—classifications be subject to less searching review? In Witmer, the 
Supreme Court finally answered that question with a resounding “no,” even 
as it affirmed the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness who claimed to be a 
conscientious objector.72 The problem for Philip Andrew Witmer was that 
there did exist “affirmative evidence” sufficient to support an “inference of 
[his] insincerity or bad faith.”73 The record in Witmer’s case showed that he 
had made several inconsistent statements, at times even suggesting he would 
be happy to support the war effort.74 This evidence, Justice Clark concluded, 
“cast considerable doubt” on Witmer’s sincerity.75 So it had been reasonable 
for draft administrators to deny his claim to a conscientious-objector 
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deferment.76 Yet how Justice Clark arrived at this conclusion was far from 
deferential to draft decisionmakers. 
Justice Clark’s majority opinion amounted to nothing less than a searching 
review of all the evidence presented during Witmer’s classification 
proceedings. This review sought to determine whether the “objective facts” 
that “cast doubt on the sincerity” of Witmer’s conscientious-objector claim 
outweighed the evidence supporting his sincerity.77 As the administrative law 
scholar Louis Jaffe remarked with surprise, not only was this approach 
unprecedented in the draft-law context, but it was also “almost identical” to 
the ever-more-demanding “substantial evidence” standard used by courts in 
evaluating the fact-finding of agencies covered by the Administrative 
Procedure Act.78 While the Universal Military Training and Service Act 
explicitly exempted the draft apparatus from the APA-imposed “substantial 
evidence” standard, such legislative exemptions no longer seemed effective: 
“Whatever the statutory formula, a court is strongly moved to administer the 
law according to its idea of the proper function of judicial review.”79  
The Witmer Court did reassert that, when reviewing draft-classification 
decisions, courts should not “look for substantial evidence,” but only check 
for some “basis in fact” supporting the decision.80 As though elaborating this 
narrower standard, Justice Clark explained that where “there was conflicting 
evidence or where two inferences could be drawn from the same testimony,” 
judges should defer to the Selective Service System.81 Yet, as Jaffe noted, 
“almost identical language was used in Universal Camera,” the case that had 
put meat on the bones of the “substantial evidence” test.82 “Unless I have 
misconceived the substantial evidence test,” Jaffe remarked, “I fail to see how, 
at least in this case, its application would have differed even in phrasing” from 
the approach taken by the Witmer Court.83 In other words, the Supreme 
Court was now treating the factual findings of draft administrators with at 
least as much skepticism as it treated the findings of administrators 
responsible for purely domestic activities unrelated to military manpower or 
national security.84 
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Jaffe’s reading of Witmer proved prophetic. By 1958, the Chief of the 
Conscientious Objector Section of the Justice Department reported that 
“notwithstanding” the Witmer Court’s gestures of deference, “courts continue 
to favor the registrant prosecuted for refusing induction after his 
conscientious objector claim is denied . . . . [W]here there is any doubt 
concerning the registrant’s sincerity or his entitlement to a procedural right, 
such doubts are generally resolved in the registrant’s favor.”85 A year later, 
Duke University law professor Robert Kramer announced that “we are 
witnessing a period of intensive criticism and reappraisal of the entire 
administrative process.”86 The realm of national-security administration was 
no exception. As an example of how willing civilian courts had become to 
police “military matters,” Kramer cited Witmer: while judicial review of draft 
classifications “was initially limited to determining only whether there was 
any ‘basis in fact’ for the classification,” “later decisions” such as Witmer had 
“approximated review . . . to the substantial evidence test customarily used” 
outside the draft context.87 
Selective Service administrators got the message immediately. Ten days 
after Witmer came down, the Selective Service General Counsel circulated a 
memorandum politely titled “Judicial Decisions Suggesting Legislative 
Correction.”88 It began with a list of recent appellate cases in which courts 
had reversed the convictions of draft resisters because the evidence weighing 
against their claims of conscientious objection was deemed insufficient to 
reasonably support an inference of insincerity. Witmer had affirmed that this 
was the right approach for courts to take. The General Counsel’s list mapped 
a minefield of evidence on which draft boards could no longer rely in 
discerning the insincerity of alleged pacifists. “Insufficient” evidence, for 
example, now included facts such as willingness to work in a naval shipyard 
and former membership in the National Guard.89 
The other three draft-law cases decided by the Supreme Court on March 
14, 1955, were as damaging as Witmer’s heightened scrutiny of Selective 
Service fact-finding, if not more so. In each case, the Court reversed a draft 
resister’s conviction because of some procedural error on the part of the 
Selective Service System. Months before these reversals, the ACLU litigator 
J.B. Tietz had noted that most draft resisters’ victories in the courts were won 
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through procedural rather than evidentiary challenges to Selective Service 
decisionmaking, and that the “increase in number of cases recognizing such” 
procedural challenges was “startling.”90 On March 14, the Supreme Court gave 
its blessing to this “startling” development. 
B. Simmons v. United States: Heightened Judicial Scrutiny of                               
Justice Department Procedures 
In Simmons v. United States, six Justices joined Justice Clark in confirming 
and extending the Court’s 1953 decision in United States v. Nugent.91 In that 
case, the Court had required that the Justice Department give conscientious-
objector claimants a “fair resume” of the reports that the FBI compiled on 
them.92 The Nugent Court based this conclusion on a strong interpretation of 
the 1951 draft law’s “hearing” provision: “The Department of Justice, after 
appropriate inquiry, shall hold a hearing with respect to the character and 
good faith [of each conscientious objector claimaint].”93 By “hearing,” the 
Nugent Court argued, Congress had surely meant a fair hearing—one in which 
the registrant could confront and rebut any evidence undermining his 
“character and good faith.”94 Such a fair hearing would only be possible if the 
registrant was given a “fair resume” of his FBI report. The Nugent Court, 
however, did not make clear what kind of “fair resume” was necessary to 
render the hearing “fair.” So between 1953 and 1955, federal judges were left 
to their own devices. They often demanded to see the entire FBI report to 
determine whether a registrant had, in fact, received a “fair resume” of its 
contents. Because these reports were considered top secret, Justice Department 
lawyers usually refused to turn them over, preferring to drop a shaky 
prosecution rather than sacrifice the autonomy of their FBI investigators. 
Two years after Nugent, the Simmons Court added meat to the bones of 
the fair-resume requirement. Invalidating the conviction of a Jehovah’s 
Witness who had received only an oral description of the contents of his FBI 
report, Justice Clark held: “A fair resume is one which will permit the 
registrant to defend against the adverse evidence—to explain it, rebut it, or 
otherwise detract from its damaging force.”95 At Simmons’s hearing, by 
contrast, “[t]he [oral] remarks of the hearing officer at most amounted to 
vague hints [about the contents of the FBI report], and these apparently 
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failed to alert [the registrant] to the dangers ahead.”96 So the hearing lacked 
“basic fairness.”97 
As in Nugent, the Supreme Court insisted that no constitutional issues 
were at stake—only Congress’s (imputed) intent to provide a “fair” Justice 
Department hearing. Yet both Simmons and Nugent exemplified the tendency 
of the Cold War Court to read statutes as requiring heightened procedural 
protections for administered parties. Without actual statutory language 
articulating these protections, their most obvious source was the Fifth 
Amendment’s right to procedural due process. 
Yet it was far from clear that even the Fifth Amendment would require a 
registrant to have an opportunity to confront all adverse evidence at his 
Justice Department hearing. The outcome of this hearing was merely 
advisory, as it was the Selective Service appeal board—not the Justice 
Department—that made the final decision about a registrant’s request for 
conscientious-objector classification. And unless the appeal board’s denial of 
this request was unanimous, the registrant could appeal the denial to the 
Presidential Appeal Board.98 Finally, even after a final classification decision 
was reached, the registrant had the right to ask his local draft board to re-
open his case to consider new evidence.99 
Given these many administrative checks on the validity of the final 
classification, as well as the advisory nature of the Justice Department’s 
recommendation, government lawyers argued that the vague summary of 
Simmons’s FBI report was at worst a “harmless error,” not a constitutional 
violation. They bolstered this argument with a citation to Market Street Railway, 
a unanimous 1945 decision in which Justice Robert Jackson wrote that the 
constitutional norm of procedural due process “is not to be trivialized by formal 
objections that have no substantial bearing on the ultimate rights of parties.”100 
In response to the government’s invocation of Market Street Railway, 
Justice Clark first sought to sidestep the issue, insisting again that the 
question was not what procedures the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution 
might impose, but the intentions of Congress—as interpreted by the Court—
in requiring a Justice Department “hearing.”101 This argument, however, was 
undermined by Justice Clark’s second response to the government: Market 
Street Railway and Simmons, he reasoned, were distinguished by the fact that 
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the first involved the regulation of public-utility companies, while the second 
involved the conscription of individual citizens, potentially in violation of 
their deeply held beliefs.102 This distinction itself, however, implied a 
constitutional argument: because draft administration threatened rights to 
bodily security and freedom of belief, rights that were of more constitutional 
significance than those at play in the economic regulation of utility 
companies, more process was due. 
Whatever the soundness—or basis—of the Simmons Court’s reasoning, 
Justice Department hearing officers would now have to detail all adverse 
evidence in a registrant’s FBI report. And they would have to do so even if 
the Selective Service System did not base its final classification decision on 
that evidence. Otherwise, the procedural error would result in invalidation of 
the classification and the government’s inability to draft the registrant or to 
prosecute him for draft evasion. 
C. Gonzales v. United States: Heightened Judicial Scrutiny of                
Selective Service Procedures 
The third case decided on March 14, Gonzales v. United States,103 furnished 
draft resisters with yet another procedural right. A month after registering 
for the draft, Jose Valdez Gonzales had become a Jehovah’s Witness 
“minister.”104 Realizing the weakness of his ministerial claim, however, 
Gonzales requested a conscientious-objector classification instead. Selective 
Service denied this request, and the Justice Department then prosecuted 
Gonzales when he refused to submit to induction.105 Lacking any better 
arguments, Gonzales’s lawyer Hayden Covington introduced a novel defense: 
because Gonzales had not been given a copy of the Justice Department’s 
advisory opinion on his conscientious-objector claim or an opportunity to file 
a reply to it, the Selective Service System’s eventual denial of his claim was 
invalid.106 This was so, Covington contended, even though Gonzales had 
never requested the advisory opinion or a chance to rebut it. 
Justice Clark and five other Justices agreed with Covington. Although the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act required no such procedures, 
these Justices found them to be “implicit” in the draft law’s “hearing” 
provision, once that provision was “viewed against our underlying concepts 
of procedural regularity and basic fair play.”107 Again, it seemed as though the 
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Justices were re-writing the draft law to accord with their understanding of 
the Fifth Amendment’s right to procedural due process. 
Notably, in Simmons, Justice Clark had dismissed the relevance of a 1945 
public-utilities decision that set limits on a party’s Fifth Amendment right to 
procedural due process. Yet in Gonzales, he himself cited three such Fifth 
Amendment precedents involving public utilities regulation to explain the 
“underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play.”108 The most 
recent was nearly twenty-years old; the two others predated the New Deal. 
These precedents, Justice Clark argued, stood for the proposition that “if the 
registrant is to present his case effectively to the [Selective Service] Appeal 
Board, he must be cognizant of all the facts before the Board as well as the 
over-all position of the Department of Justice.”109 
As so often happened in the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court was 
resurrecting old constitutional limitations on economic regulation to 
constrain national-security regulation that might otherwise threaten an 
individual’s civil liberties. This resurrection was odd in that the Gonzales 
majority insisted that its decision simply reflected the will of Congress, rather 
than the Justices’ own views of what the Constitution required. 
In dissent, Justices Reed and Burton marveled at Justice Clark’s 
acrobatics. Insisting that Gonzales’s classification process had violated no 
“express or implied” statutory requirements or administrative regulations, 
Justices Reed and Burton suggested that the majority’s decision could only 
be understood as imposing on the draft apparatus constitutional norms that 
had fallen into disrepute decades earlier.110 Justice Sherman Minton—the sole 
dissenter in all four March 14th decisions—went further, describing the 
Court’s rapid slide from strict deference to invasive supervision of the 
Selective Service System as legally inexplicable.111 Minton recognized that 
nine years earlier, the Estep Court had broken with tradition in holding that 
registrants could challenge their draft classifications in federal court without 
first submitting to induction. But the Estep majority had justified this decision 
on the ground that the scope of judicial review would be extremely narrow 
and deferential. As Minton emphasized, Estep directed judges to invalidate 
Selective Service decisions only if the System had acted beyond its 
jurisdiction—that is, if draft administrators had made a decision with no 
factual support or in clear violation of the draft law. 
Nine years later, however, the Supreme Court held that the Justice 
Department’s failure to give Gonzales a copy of its advisory opinion about 
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his conscientious-objector claim rendered his final classification invalid. This 
was so even though no law or regulation “require[d] the Department of Justice 
to send [the registrant] a copy of its advisory report,” and even though the 
Department’s advisory opinion had no binding effect on the Select Service 
System’s eventual classification of Gonzales.112 Given these facts, it was hard 
to see how the Selective Service appeal board had “los[t] its jurisdiction or 
act[ed] beyond it” in denying Gonzales a conscientious-objector 
classification.113 Nor was the Supreme Court’s imposition of its own views of 
optimal administrative procedure a minor inconvenience. Gonzales forced the 
Selective Service System to reopen all cases in which a draft appeal board had 
denied a conscientious-objector claim without allowing the registrant to read 
and respond to the Justice Department’s advisory opinion.114 
D. Sicurella v. United States: Heightened Judicial Scrutiny of            
Administrative Statutory Interpretation 
The Court’s final March 14th decision, Sicurella v. United States,115 
exemplified Minton’s legal and ideological disagreement with the majority’s 
approach in draft-law cases. Anthony Sicurella was a Jehovah’s Witness who 
claimed entitlement to a CO classification even though he was willing to fight 
to defend “Kingdom Interests, our preaching work, our meetings, our fellow 
brethren and sisters and our property against attack.”116 Because of Sicurella’s 
belief in the righteousness of certain forms of combat, the Justice Department 
concluded that Sicurella had “failed to establish that he is opposed to war in 
any form,” the statutory requirement for CO classification.117 Accordingly, 
Sicurella was not “entitled to exemption within the meaning of the Act.”118 
Seven Justices disagreed with the Justice Department’s legal reasoning and 
concluded that this legal error invalidated the draft appeal board’s decision.119 
The majority reached its conclusion even though there was no evidence 
that the draft board had denied Sicurella’s claim based on the Justice 
Department’s legal reasoning. And as the Solicitor General argued, even if 
Sicurella’s willingness to fight to defend “Kingdom Interests” did not 
automatically disqualify him from a CO classification, the draft board could 
have reasonably interpreted Sicurella’s views on justified violence as casting 
 
112 Id. at 417 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
113 Id. at 418 (Minton, J., dissenting). 
114 See Letter from Col. Ingold to Willoughby, AFSC (Apr. 1, 1955), NARA, RG 147, Central 
Files 1948-1963, Box 96 (announcing the decision to reopen all such cases). 
115 348 U.S. 385 (1955). 
116 Id. at 387. 
117 Id. at 388. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 392. 
 
1770 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1749 
doubt on the sincerity of his claim to object to “war in any form.”120 But the 
Sicurella majority rejected this argument too, concluding as a matter of law 
that willingness to fight in what it described as “theocratic war” provided no 
basis for denying a CO classification.121 In doing so, the majority chose to 
interpret Sicurella’s testimony as evincing only a commitment to engage in 
“spiritual” combat. This interpretation contradicted Sicurella’s own 
testimony that he would fight to defend the perfectly material property 
interests of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
Dissenting, Justice Minton bridled at the high-handedness of the 
majority’s pronouncements. He accused his fellow Justices of arrogating to 
themselves the lawful authority possessed by draft administrators to 
determine the most efficient and fair management of military manpower: “It 
is not our province to substitute our judgment of the facts for that of the 
Board or to correct the Board’s errors of law unless they are so wanton, 
arbitrary and capricious as to destroy the jurisdiction of the Board.”122 Minton 
again emphasized that while the Estep Court had exposed Selective Service 
decisions to limited judicial review, it had also insisted that judges should 
only overturn decisions that were truly beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Selective Service System—decisions with no basis in fact or statutory 
support.123 So long as draft administrators stayed within these minimal 
jurisdictional bounds, Estep had called on judges to uphold Selective Service 
decisions, “even though they may be erroneous.”124 In Sicurella, however, 
seven Justices invalidated a classification decision precisely because they 
believed it to be “erroneous,” not because they found “that the Board acted 
capriciously and arbitrarily or that the judgment of the Board was not an 
allowable judgment of reasonable men.”125 The Sicurella majority simply 
believed that its legal and factual conclusions were superior to those of the 
draft board. The majority’s conclusions might well be sound, Minton allowed, 
but courts lacked the authority and the competence to impose their notion of 
sound draft policy on the Selective Service System. 
Minton’s March 14 dissents focused on the negative impact that the 
majority’s reasoning would have on the legal and practical integrity of 
conscription. But they also bore traces of a more general anxiety about the 
fate of the administrative state that Minton had worked to build as an Indiana 
public-utilities administrator and a fiercely pro-New-Deal Senator during the 
1930s. Back then, Minton had parried constitutional attacks on New Deal 
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administration by arguing that the Constitution was “the people’s creation, 
designed and intended to bring the greatest good to the greatest number.”126 
When people were suffering, it was thus an oxymoron to say that the 
Constitution barred the government from coming to their aid. “You can’t 
frighten people by talking to them about their loss of liberty as if liberty was 
something apart from human happiness,” Minton argued during his 1934 
Senate campaign. “You can’t frighten people today about the loss of their 
constitutional rights when they are struggling to live.”127 
By the mid-1950s, however, Minton’s view of the Constitution as a popular 
charter that not only authorized but required political institutions to advance 
the interests of all those Americans “struggling to live” had fallen out of favor. 
His 1955 draft-law dissents took aim at the increasingly dominant alternative 
view, one that treated the Constitution as a judicially enforced charter of 
substantive rights and procedural rules that protected individuals from undue 
government coercion. While most judges serving in the federal courts in the 
mid-1950s were, like Minton, Democratic appointees, they had gradually 
abandoned their New Deal trust in an autonomous administrative state—
especially when it came to administrative decisions that risked encroaching 
on civil liberties.128 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY: THE SELECTIVE 
SERVICE SYSTEM AND  THE DEFERMENT LOBBY 
This change in the judicial mood only became more apparent in the weeks 
following the Supreme Court’s March 14, 1955 draft-law decisions. On March 
21, Selective Service headquarters began to receive news of draft-law violators 
who could no longer be “successfully prosecuted” because of newly recognized 
procedural “defects.”129 Two days later, draft administrators reported a slew 
of judicial decisions holding that a registrant’s suspiciously recent conversion 
to pacifism was not a proper basis for denying his conscientious-objector 
claim.130 Then, on March 28, the Supreme Court itself reentered the fray. Its 
unsigned opinion in Bates v. United States reversed the National Appeal 
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Board’s denial of a conscientious-objector claim despite ample evidence of 
insincerity in the registrant’s file.131 
Without acknowledging the novelty of its reasoning, the Bates Court 
explained that the National Appeal Board had committed a procedural error 
when it denied Bates’s claim without first forwarding his file to the Justice 
Department for an advisory opinion. As evidence of the need for this 
procedure, the Court simply cited the draft-law provision that entitled a 
registrant to a Justice Department hearing if his local draft board denied his 
initial conscientious-objector claim.132 That provision, however, was not 
applicable to Bates’s case. Bates’s local board had in fact granted his initial 
conscientious-objector claim.133 It was only when Bates refused to comply 
with the work requirements for conscientious objectors and requested instead 
a ministerial exemption on dubious factual grounds, that the Presidential 
Appeal Board concluded that Bates’s initial conscientious-objector 
classification was unwarranted.134 The lower courts had found this conclusion 
to be reasonable given Bates’s evasive actions.135 
The Bates decision implied that any time the Selective Service System 
intended to deny or rescind a conscientious-objector classification—whether 
at the local draft-board stage or after several requests for alternative 
classification—the matter had to be referred to the Justice Department before 
a final administrative decision could be made. Not only would this new 
requirement slow down the draft classification process, but it was also an utter 
invention of the Supreme Court, nowhere to be found in the draft law and 
imposed without explanation. Indeed, it was unclear what the Justice 
Department was supposed to do after receiving such a case from the National 
Appeal Board. 
The statutory provision cited by the Supreme Court instructed the 
Department to send its advisory opinion to the registrant’s state appeal board. 
But in Bates, the state appeal board had already ruled on the case—denying 
Bates’s ministerial request and affirming his CO request. Was the Justice 
Department instead expected to send its advisory opinion back to the 
National Appeal Board? Presumably. But the Supreme Court did not say so. 
Nor did it say that such a procedure was required by the Constitution. It 
simply cited a provision of the draft law that did not apply to the case at hand. 
At Selective Service headquarters, the Bates decision was met with a 
beleaguered shrug. As two lawyers in the General Counsel’s Office reported: 
 
131 348 U.S. 966 (1955). 
132 Id. 
133 Bates v. United States, 216 F.2d 130, 133 (8th Cir. 1954), rev’d, 348 U.S. 966 (1955). 
134 Id. at 134. 
135 Id. at 134-135. 
2019] New Look Constitutionalism 1773 
“Today the Supreme Court . . . [has] seemed to add one more right to 
conscientious objectors by holding that [the draft law] requires that where a 
conscientious objector claim has been denied by the National Appeal Board 
without [the registrant’s] selective service file having been referred to the 
Department of Justice for inquiry, hearing and recommendation, the 
registrant has been denied procedural due process.”136 The Court had not 
explicitly used the language of “procedural due process,” or referred to any 
other constitutional norm. But, by this time, Selective Service lawyers felt 
that nothing else could explain the Court’s increasingly outlandish 
interpretations of the draft law. The Court was not only going out of its way 
to find procedural errors in the classification process, but it was also writing 
new procedural requirements into the draft law. Accordingly, the General 
Counsel’s Office placed its report on Bates in an ever-growing file of “Judicial 
Decisions Suggesting Legislative Correction.”137 
According to a group of federal judges, such “legislative correction” would 
be essential if the Selective Service System wanted to slow the courts’ 
encroachment on the draft apparatus. In mid-April, Daniel Omer, the 
General Counsel of Selective Service, had asked twelve judges with some of 
the largest draft-law caseloads in the country to give him a sense of how far 
lower courts might extend the Supreme Court’s recent decisions. The short 
answer was “very far.”138 For example, eleven of the twelve judges felt that 
even though the Simmons decision did not require the Justice Department to 
hand over full FBI reports to every would-be conscientious objector, that is 
what should be done going forward.139 These judges believed that 
withholding the reports was “fundamentally wrong.”140 Several judges also 
suggested that a “Government Appeal Agent” be present at every local draft-
board meeting to ensure that all of a registrant’s rights were protected.141 
Most significantly, a majority of the judges told Omer that if Congress did 
not take affirmative steps to reject the Supreme Court’s recent interpretations 
of the draft law, the Selective Service System should “expect all Federal courts 
to tend toward leniency in the [law’s] enforcement.” 142 
Six weeks before the March 14 Supreme Court decisions, Selective 
Service Director Hershey and General Counsel Omer had in fact prepared a 
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memorandum of proposed amendments to the Universal Military Training 
and Service Act, which was coming up for renewal in June 1955.143 Perhaps 
the two most radical amendments sought to restore an earlier era of judicial 
deference to Selective Service decisionmaking. The first would reverse the 
trend of increasing judicial scrutiny of the merits of individual draft 
classifications: “The decisions of selective service boards should be made final 
and not subject to judicial review except as to procedural errors involving a 
denial of due process.”144 The second would limit the judicial venues in which 
registrants could challenge their classifications: “The law should conform to 
early decisions of the Supreme Court under which selective service 
classifications are reviewed only in habeas corpus proceedings in which the 
Government may appeal from an adverse decision.”145 
The next group of amendments aimed to empower draft administrators 
to police the many claims that could qualify someone as a conscientious 
objector or minister. These amendments responded to recent successes scored 
by Jehovah’s Witnesses and other unorthodox draft resisters in the courts. 
First, Omer and Hershey recommended that “[i]n considering claims of 
conscientious objection, the law should specifically permit selective service 
boards, in determining registrant’s sincerity, to consider his belief in 
theocratic warfare, his willingness to kill in self-defense, his humility, and the 
time when he was converted.”146 These sorts of beliefs were traditional red 
flags of an insincere or fair-weather pacifist. Second, in an effort to prevent 
young men from entering and leaving the ministry when convenient, “[t]he 
classification of a minister and of a ministerial student should constitute a 
deferment rather than an exemption so as to extend liability.”147 Third, “[t]he 
definition of a minister should exclude ministerial effort in the publication 
and sale of religious literature,” the sorts of activities in which nearly all 
practicing Jehovah’s Witnesses were engaged.148 
Hershey and Omer also wanted to make draft resistance a riskier 
proposition. First, they proposed that convicted draft law violators serve a 
term of imprisonment “at least equal to the time the violator[s] would have 
spent in military service if [they] had complied with the law.”149 This 
amendment responded to frequent reports of light sentences—sometimes 
just probation—handed down by judges in draft-law cases. Second, in 
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response to the tendency of conscientious objectors to buck their alternative-
service obligations, Omer and Hershey proposed that “[a]ll penalties which 
apply to the evasion of military service should be made to apply to evasion of 
work in lieu of induction; as for example: loss of citizenship for leaving the 
country to avoid service.”150 
Finally, turning from the courts to problems within the executive branch, 
Hershey and Omer recommended that “[t]he Director of Selective Service 
should be given primary responsibility for the enforcement of the law.”151 This 
proposal was a desperate response to growing mistrust between the Selective 
Service System and the Justice Department. The Department’s reluctance to 
prosecute draft-law violators, its willingness to question draft boards’ 
conclusions, and its resistance to Selective Service influence on litigation 
strategy were all on the rise. 
Hershey and Omer first circulated their list of statutory fixes on January 
31, 1955. The next day, however, they received a copy of the Second Hoover 
Commission’s proposed Administrative Code. At once, their focus shifted 
from rolling back the courts to keeping Congress at bay. Six weeks later, they 
were forced to change directions again to triage the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s mid-March decisions on lower courts, local draft boards, and the 
Justice Department. In May 1955, even as the threat from the Second Hoover 
Commission subsided, the Selective Service System was bleeding badly from 
court-inflicted wounds. The number of draft-law amendments that Congress 
would need to pass to repair the damage had ballooned since the end of 
January. Worse still, the legislative will necessary to pass such a raft of 
amendments was missing. 
While Congress had balked at the Second Hoover Commission’s radical 
proposals for more judicial control of the administrative state, the autonomy 
of draft administrators was anything but a legislative priority. To the contrary, 
congressional hearings on the extension of the draft law in June 1955 focused 
on Director Hershey’s continuing refusal to establish regulations deferring 
students and scientists en masse. Such regulations would deprive local draft-
board administrators of all discretion in determining whether a given 
registrant’s professional expertise or course of study truly merited a 
deferment in the interests of national security. Frustrated with Hershey’s 
intransigence on this score, lobbyists from the education, pharmaceutical, and 
defense industries, along with their supporters in Congress, pushed for a 
“special national committee” of twelve outside experts who would have the 
authority to veto Selective Service deferment policies.152 
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To help fend off such a sharp political blow to their agency’s autonomy, 
Hershey and Omer had included in the January memorandum two proposals 
designed to conciliate the “deferment lobby.” These proposed amendments 
extended the “II-S” student deferment to both high school and college 
students and expanded the number of years during which men would be 
eligible for such a deferment.153 Neither of these amendments advanced 
Hershey and Omer’s primary goal: preventing lawyers and judges from 
dictating Selective Service policy in the name of civil liberty. In fact, the 
deferment amendments would shift draft policy in a more “civil libertarian” 
direction, entitling draft-aged men to deferments throughout their high 
school and college careers, with a corresponding decrease in the pool of young 
Americans subject to compulsory military service. But at least the Selective 
Service System itself—rather than outside experts—would retain the 
authority to administer these changes. Hershey “considered it essential to 
preserve the draft system,” even if it meant consigning his agency to a 
“purgatory of special registrants.”154 The reward for enduring such purgatory 
might even be political support for some of Hershey and Omer’s more high-
priority proposals, which aimed to roll back judicial supervision of the draft. 
No such reward, however, was forthcoming. In the end, the student-
deferment amendments were the only aspect of Hershey and Omer’s 
memorandum that Congress actually adopted. These amendments appealed 
to influential constituencies: corporations, universities, middle-class families, 
and military intellectuals who believed the Cold War would be won by 
“brainpower” rather than manpower. But they were a devil’s bargain, marking 
a major departure from the traditional goal of the Selective Service System: 
the relatively egalitarian induction of civilians into the armed forces. 
Selective Service had emerged in World War I as a tool for both mobilizing 
and uniting the population in an era of class and cultural conflict, and the 
World War II draft had largely honored this earlier experiment. By the early 
1950s, however, many politicians, military modernizers, and private-sector 
lobbyists were ready to recast conscription as a tool for differentiating citizens 
in the interests of economic and scientific growth. A repurposed Selective 
Service System would channel less “talented” young men toward the 
frontlines when necessary, while encouraging the more “talented” to enter the 
ranks of a burgeoning white-collar, highly skilled middle class.155 
Director Hershey had resisted this vision of a “meritocratic” draft much 
longer than most. In 1953, when a “campaign of professional organizations” 
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demanded “veto power over classification procedures” to shield the nation’s 
better-educated youth from military service, Hershey warned that “[y]ou 
can’t teach democracy and practice oligarchy of any intellectual sort.”156 He 
pleaded with the American Association for the Advancement of Science “to 
avoid promoting the idea that any civilian activity should provide an 
exemption from military service.”157 And he bitterly joked that it was 
becoming “almost an act of treason to even think of taking” an engineering 
student out of school, “whether he makes grades or not.”158 But in 1955, the 
tide turned for good. 
The student-deferment amendments that Selective Service officials 
proposed as something of a sweetener in January 1955 had become the main 
course by June. That month, “[t]o the surprise of many,” Hershey opened his 
congressional testimony on the draft renewal bill by lauding “the value of the 
deferment system.”159 He not only championed the student deferment 
amendments but “began speaking in a positive vein of how the Selective 
Service had a new major task—that of channeling young men into nationally 
needed careers.”160 Behind closed doors, Hershey admitted that he still “had 
many reservations” about using the draft apparatus to benefit young would-
be professionals and their private-sector employers; this kind of government 
benefit was “highly flavored with escapism,” and risked eroding the integrity 
and legitimacy of conscription.161 But at least in public, Hershey now 
celebrated the very aspect of Selective Service—channeling men away from the 
military—that two years earlier he had bemoaned as “a very foul thing.”162 
Given the precarious state of the Selective Service System’s legal, 
political, and military reputation, Hershey could no longer afford to disparage 
the one aspect of conscription celebrated by both civilian elites and military 
strategists: its capacity to steer young, well-qualified men toward careers in 
science, technology, and the study of strategically significant languages and 
cultures. The agency’s 1957 annual report described the Selective Service 
System as “a storekeeper of manpower,” and emphasized that the System’s 
function was “not only to procure manpower for the armed forces, but also to 
defer them to train for and perform important tasks in civilian life.”163 The 
1958 annual report went a step further, openly embracing the language of 
“channeling” to describe the agency’s use of deferments to shape the civilian 
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economy.164 In September of that year, Director Hershey argued that the draft 
should be renewed because the Selective Service System was “the only agency 
now in existence having and exercising authority which induces individuals to 
train for, enter upon and remain in activities essential to the national economy.”165 
Congress generally approved of the agency’s new focus on boosting 
entrance of qualified young men into particular civilian professions, rather 
than the military. One exception was Senator Strom Thurmond, whose main 
constituency was poor white Southerners, unlikely to benefit from the 
metastasizing network of deferments. In June 1957, he wrote to Selective 
Service headquarters to complain about the injustice of this state of affairs.166 
How could draft administrators force some young men to fight for a pittance, 
Thurmond asked, while encouraging far more to pursue safe, lucrative 
careers?167 In reply, Director Hershey first suggested that he was simply 
applying the law as written. The Universal Military Training and Service Act 
directed his agency “to provide . . . for the ‘maximum effort in the fields of 
scientific research and development, and the fullest possible utilization of the 
Nation’s technological, scientific and other critical manpower resources.’”168 
This language, however, had been on the books since 1948.169 Only 
recently had Hershey reconciled himself to implementing the law in such as 
a way as to channel as many men as possible away from boot camp and toward 
university labs and corporate offices. Traces of this earlier reluctance laced 
Hershey’s effort to justify “channeling” to Senator Thurmond. “It is not 
inconsistent with fairness and justice,” the Director somewhat haltingly 
argued, “that, in the interest of technological and scientific progress and the 
maintenance of the national economy, some men may temporarily be deferred 
from performing their obligation to the Nation in the armed forces.”170 The 
noble principle of “[u]niversality of service,” it turned out, was open to several 
interpretations; “practically” speaking, the principle could certainly not mean 
that “ten out of ten [men] will serve on active duty.”171 
Hershey’s letter to Senator Thurmond was one of the “ever more tortured 
formulations” that government officials used to justify a coercive apparatus 
whose legitimacy depended on two conflicting demands: that everyone be 
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equally coerced and that no one be coerced at all.172 The language of “fairness,” 
often invoked in debates about the draft and the administrative state more 
generally, tended to paper over this tension between the egalitarian and the 
libertarian critiques of bureaucracy. Hershey could not take a more egalitarian 
position on educational and professional deferments because his agency had 
been battered by libertarian criticisms for so long. Letting students off the 
hook was one way to alleviate concerns about the threat the draft posed to 
individual liberty. 
As early as the Korean War, polling had suggested that the provision of 
student deferments would be critical to regulating a restive population. 
Between 1952 and 1953, eighty-three percent of male college students 
reported a “negative attitude toward [military] service,” and sixty-two percent 
of college students either “had reservations” about or “were strongly opposed 
to the war.” 173 In this ideological climate, the strictly military case for student 
deferments—that they ensured a supply of scientific Cold Warriors—was 
overdetermined by political dissatisfaction with the draft. “By satisfying the 
demands for preferential treatment of various groups,” one political scientist 
notes, “the Selective Service System was able to insulate itself from organized 
and politically effective protest.”174 
Such “insulation,” however, was more of a rearguard action than a 
preemptive strike. The leaner budgets and private-sector protectionism that 
came to characterize Selective Service by the late 1950s did mollify some 
powerful socio-economic factions. Yet, as in other administrative contexts, 
cost cutting and cooperation with the private sector would never satisfy the 
strong critics of public manpower management. They believed that only the 
submission of the draft apparatus to court-like procedures and extensive 
judicial oversight could preserve individual liberty in a bureaucratic age. 
These arguments had shrunk the coercive power of the Selective Service 
System by mid-1957, smoothing the way for draft administrators’ acceptance 
of a new, more passive role as guardians of the elite, well-educated Cold Warrior. 
Historians of the draft have generally attributed Selective Service 
Director Hershey’s about-face to “political reality.”175 As George Flynn 
writes, Hershey was “a realist” who “trimm[ed] his sails” to “accommodate[] 
the drive for deferments.”176 Yet the “drive for deferments” was not 
significantly stronger in the late spring of 1955, when Hershey identified 
channeling and volunteering as the two main functions of the Selective 
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Service System, than it had been six months earlier. At that time, Hershey 
and his General Counsel, Daniel Omer, had proposed a set of amendments 
relatively light on deferments and long on streamlined induction procedures 
and stiff penalties for draft resistance. What had changed between January 
and June was not simply the “political reality” but also the legal landscape— 
specifically, the March 1955 Supreme Court decisions. 
The disposition of these Selective Service cases, the Justice Department’s 
lackluster performance in arguing them, and the lower courts’ zeal in 
implementing them all indicated that legal elites had lost faith in the Selective 
Service System’s traditional functions: the efficient and egalitarian induction 
of civilians into the armed forces; and the adjudication of individual requests 
for deferment or exemption. Sustained legal resistance to the draft did not 
simply represent one threat among many to Hershey’s vision of Selective 
Service. It also transformed the threat posed by the “deferment lobby” into 
an opportunity. If the courts were going to keep increasing the costs—in 
terms of time, resources, and legitimacy—of inducting draft registrants and 
adjudicating their classification requests, then it might be better, after all, for 
Selective Service to downsize its induction and adjudication business. The 
deferment lobby’s call for the Selective Service System to focus on 
channeling rather than conscription offered the agency a new purpose that 
could both minimize conflict with the courts and cultivate powerful 
constituencies elsewhere in the government and civil society. 
CONCLUSION 
If streamlined administrative adjudication of claims to deferment or 
exemption from compulsory public service offended the civil libertarian 
conscience of the 1950s, this was in large part because the civil-libertarian 
conscience of the 1950s was inextricably bound up with the cause of 
administrative-law reform. In the eyes of an increasingly bipartisan coalition 
of reformers, manpower administration on the Selective Service model lacked 
the procedural protections that supposedly distinguished Anglo-Saxon 
fairness from communistic fiat. Unelected bureaucrats committed first and 
foremost to the success of a particular regulatory agenda could not be trusted 
to preserve the rule of law, let alone the civil liberty of any particular individual. 
So federal courts in the mid-1950s radically curtailed the autonomy of the 
Selective Service System, interpreting the draft law in such a way as to permit 
more, and more searching, judicial review. Judges also used creative statutory 
and regulatory interpretation to limit draft administrators’ discretion, 
requiring them to follow a complex set of procedures and to establish a robust 
evidentiary record if they wanted their decisions about draft registrants’ 
eligibility for military service to withstand judicial scrutiny. 
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This judicial assault on Selective Service autonomy and discretion was a 
leading indicator of the federal courts’ more general turn against New Deal-
style administration during the Eisenhower presidency. In an era defined by 
anti-communism at home and abroad, judges were inclined to view the 
administrative adjudication of individual rights (whether constitutional or 
statutory in form) as procedurally flawed, substantively indifferent to 
constitutionally protected civil liberties, and overly driven by the interests of 
particular agencies and their private sector supporters, rather than the 
overarching public interest.177 
That the Selective Service System fell victim to this legal transformation 
more quickly and definitively than many other agencies is both 
understandable and ironic. Understandable because the peacetime draft 
represented a particularly extreme example of the threat that administrative 
decisionmaking could pose to personal liberty. Ironic because most Selective 
Service leaders in the late 1940s and early 1950s remained unusually 
committed to the old progressive conception of the “public interest,” working 
to harmonize as best they could the competing demands of military necessity, 
equality of sacrifice, and cultural pluralism.178 These leaders also fiercely 
resisted the capture of the draft apparatus by private-sector interests seeking 
special treatment for certain groups of draft registrants. It was only the 
judiciary’s singling out of the Selective Service System as a particularly bad 
actor when it came to procedural fairness and civil liberty that made 
capitulation to private-sector interests so attractive to draft administrators. 
A similar transformation had occurred at other agencies, such as the 
Federal Communications Commission.179 But conscription’s more totalizing 
effects on civilian society elicited intense resistance from both the judiciary 
and the private sector. The result was a wholesale reconstruction-from-within 
of the Selective Service System’s core functions. Draft administrators re-
branded themselves as channelers of “brainpower” into private sector 
professions rather than coercers of “manpower” into public sector service. 
By the end of the 1950s, the primacy of channeling, and the deferment 
system that underwrote it, made the Selective Service System relatively 
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popular but also, in Director Hershey’s own words, troublingly “soft.”180 If 
the deferments ever went away, he warned, if draft calls ever rose again to the 
levels necessary to conduct a real shooting war, the System would lose its base 
of popular support just as it confronted a new salvo of litigation from draft 
registrants unwilling to serve.181 Such litigation would, in turn, renew the 
conflict between the Selective Service System and federal prosecutors and 
judges. By the mid-1950s, these two groups of legal elites had come to view 
draft administration as a regrettable departure from the values of civil liberty 
and the rule of law that distinguished the United States from its communist 
adversaries. A decade later, their verdict would be even harsher. 
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